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Introduction
On Sunday, May 26th 2013, something quite re-
markable happened in Kodaira City, Western 
Tokyo. Over 50,000 citizens voted in Tokyo’s 
very first citizen-initiated local referendum 
(jūmin tōhyō) on the issue of whether a 50-year-
old plan to construct a road should be reviewed 
or not. The Kodaira referendum came at a time 
when civil society in Japan is said to be flourish-
ing. Although the Kodaira referendum was the 
first in the capital, the past 10 years have seen 
an unprecedented nine referendums on a vari-
ety of local issues. However, as citizens’ voices 
have grown louder, resistance to direct democ-
racy among local and national governments has 
also been growing. The Kodaira referendum is a 
case in point: the Kodaira ballots have – to date 
– still not been opened, thanks to an amendment 
passed in a special session of the local assembly 
a month before the vote which set a minimum 
turnout as a condition for their opening.
 This paper looks at the push and pull of 
grassroots democracy in contemporary Japan: 
the participation of local residents in contem-
porary Japan and the moves by government to 
limit that participation. The central question is: 
is Japanese civil society flowering, as is often 
claimed, or actually withering? Section 1 defines 
civil society. Section 2 describes the emergence 
and development of civil society in Japan, from 
the AMPO demonstrations of the 1960s and the 
rise of NGOs in the 1980s, through the Great 
Hanshin Earthquake of 1995 and the post 3/11 
anti-nuclear demonstrations. Arguing for a 
broader definition of civil society that includes 
individual action, section 3 looks at the history 
of the referendum in Japan in general and the 
case of Kodaira in particular. Finally, section 4 
discusses the future prospects for civil society in 
Japan against the background of consolidation by 
political conservatives and growing nationalism.
1. What is Civil Society?
The classical definition of civil society refers 
to voluntary, self-organised not-for-profit social 
activities carried out by groups and associa-
tions in the public sphere outside the state, the 
market, and the family. Not all non-state groups 
qualify as part of civil society; Hirata (2002: 10) 
excludes groups which do not promote plural-
ism and diversity, such as extreme ring-wing 
groups. Nevertheless, the definition of civil soci-
ety is broad and includes everything from the 
300,000 or so local neighbourhood associations 
(chōnaikai) to organisations of various sizes with 
economic, cultural, educational, developmental, 
environmental, human rights, or other agendas. 
Autonomy from the power of the state – at least 
to some degree – is central, since such groups 
are supposed to function as a buffer between 
the state and the individual. The question of 
autonomy, however, is a key problem for the 
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We know you are busy at work every day and, moreover,
embarrassed to participate in a demonstration.
But if we give up here and now and fall silent
Japan will never improve for the better.
At the very least, we want to act now so that someday, when
our children ask, “What were you doing then?” we will not be ashamed.
Marching Refrain of the Voices of the Voiceless Association (Avenell 2010: 94)
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standard definition. This is because the degree 
of independence of organisations from the state 
is rarely absolute and the state has a significant 
influence on which groups flourish and which 
do not. Pekkanen (2006), for example, notes that 
Japan has many small, local groups with few or 
no employees but few large, professionally man-
aged national organisations, such as Greenpeace, 
a pattern he calls Japan’s “dual civil society” and 
which he puts down to strict state oversight 
and regulations.
 Two kinds of groups which are often 
mentioned in discussions of civil society are 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs or hiʼ-
seifu-soshiki) and non-profit organisations (NPOs 
or hiʼeiri-soshiki). The labeling is misleading be-
cause both types of group are non-governmen-
tal, non-profit civic organisations. In Japan, the 
main difference is that NGOs refer to organisa-
tions engaged in international affairs and global 
issues (whether within or outside Japan)1 while 
NPOs refer to groups involved in domestic 
activities in Japan. The fact that many groups 
are involved in both makes the distinction less 
than helpful and in practice the terms are often 
used interchangeably. Sugushita (2001: 5-8) even 
suggests that the choice of term relates more 
to the connotations of sacrifice contained in the 
latter against the left-leaning anti-government 
nuance contained in the former. One important 
distinction that is clear relates to legal status. 
Unincorporated associations (usually called civic 
groups or shimin dantai), which make up the 
majority of groups, lack legal protection and tax 
breaks but enjoy relative freedom from state 
supervision. On the other hand, incorporated 
associations (hōjin) comprise both public interest 
corporations (kōeki hōjin) and specified non-prof-
it activity associations (tokutei hi’eiri katsudō 
hōjin). Hirata (2002: 13-14) describes the former 
as privileged and elite “private-public hybrid 
NGOs” with strong ties (and obligations) to gov-
ernment and the latter – made possible by the 
1  The Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation 
identifies a medical mission to help refugees in China in 
1938 as the first NGO (JANIC 2013).
confusingly named 1998 NPO law (Tokutei Hi’ei-
ri Katsudō Sokushin Hō) – as relatively more 
independent of the state.
2. The Emergence of Civil Society in Japan
Many commentators have argued that, tradi-
tionally, Japan has had a weak civil society. 
In the 1990s, for example, Samuel Huntingdon 
(1993: 71) described the “poverty” of civil society 
in Japan and non-Western countries in contrast 
to European pluralism. Van-Wolferen (1993: 62) 
noted the “absence” of a strong civil society in 
Japan, describing it as “extremely weak and in-
effectual.” There are a number of reasons why 
a vibrant civil society has been slow to emerge 
in Japan. Post-war, the exclusive focus on eco-
nomic growth known as the “developmental 
state” – underpinned by a strong bureaucracy 
– inhibited the growth of Japanese civil society. 
Cultural reasons are also frequently cited. These 
include the idea that the Buddhist tradition is 
less activist-oriented and “evangelical” compared 
to Christian religions,2 the group-oriented nature 
of Japanese society which tends to stress mutu-
al assistance within the group before extending 
help outside, and Japan’s Confucian tradition 
which has led the Japanese to rely heavily on 
and defer to the government (Hirata 2002: 23-
25). It has also been suggested that the Japanese 
development model is less adversarial than the 
West’s with government, corporations and citi-
zens perceived as “cooperating” to achieve the 
same goal. In this way, there is less belief in the 
need for an independent sector and consequent-
ly, non-profit work is not seen as a “regular” 
profession.
 Behind these cultural explanations for Japa-
nese civil society as weak are dominant nation-
al stereotypes which portray the Japanese as 
conflict-averse, passive, and docile. For example, 
writing post 3/11 The New York Times (2011) 
2  The low rate of Japanese giving to charity is often 
cited as evidence. For example, donations to NPOs are 
much lower in Japan than the US or UK, particularly 
individual donations (Cabinet Office 2013a).
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described Japanese civic activism as “excep-
tional” in a people who “generally trust their 
leaders.” Similarly, the Los Angeles Times (2011), 
describing growing criticism of authority, char-
acterised the Japanese as a conformist group-ori-
ented people who are “taught to respect author-
ity from an early age.” Even the Japan Times 
(2011a; 2012a) remarked that a “usually sedate” 
Japan is not commonly known for having large-
scale demonstrations or violent antigovernment 
protests. The genre of writing on Japanese na-
tional identity known as Nihonjinron – popular 
inside and outside Japan – has certainly had a 
role in promulgating and reinforcing such ste-
reotypes. Mouer and Sugimoto (1986: 406) note 
that the Nihonjinron discourse has two central 
tenets: Japanese society is ‘uniquely’ unique and 
group orientation is the dominant cultural pat-
tern which shapes behaviour.
 Although civil society is not the same thing 
as democracy, civil society is often viewed as 
the foundation of democracy and a democrat-
ic system is in turn needed for civil society 
to flourish. The roots of Japan’s civil society 
today can be traced to the enactment of the 
new Constitution of Japan in May 1947 which 
marked the birth of liberal democracy in Japan. 
Although the Taisho period (1912-26) saw more 
voters enfranchised, greater female participation 
in politics, and broader representational gov-
ernment, universal suffrage was only realised 
in 1946. Of particular note was the emphasis on 
the principle of popular sovereignty in the new 
constitution, as introduced in the preamble:
sovereign power resides with the people… 
…Government is a sacred trust of the 
people, the authority for which is derived 
from the people, the powers of which 
are exercised by the representatives of 
the people, and the benefits of which are 
enjoyed by the people. This is a universal 
principle of mankind upon which this 
Constitution is founded
Thus, in contrast to the pre-war idea that sov-
ereignty lay with the Emperor, the post-war 
constitution makes it clear that sovereignty lies 
with the people and defines The Emperor is 
merely “the symbol of the State and the unity of 
the people” who derives his position “from the 
will of the people with whom resides sovereign 
power” (Article 1). The “rights and duties of the 
people”, in particular “individual rights” (jinkaku) 
are mentioned throughout.
 In contrast to the stark difference between 
pre-war and post-war constitutions, many po-
litical and government personnel continued 
in their positions post-war, often after being 
briefly purged and even imprisoned for war-
crimes. Yoshida Shigeru, for example, who was 
Prime-Minister for most of the period from 1946 
to 1954 was imprisoned for several months in 
1945 while Nobusuke Kishi (Prime-Minister from 
1957-1960) was held as a “Class A” war crimes 
suspect until his release in 1948. The contrast 
between the ideals of the constitution and the 
thinking of the old-guard was highlighted by 
Kishi’s pushing through of the revised US-Japan 
Mutual Security Treaty (AMPO) in May 1960 
and his dismissal of the ensuing protesters as 
“distasteful” and “insignificant” (Time 1960).
2.1  Early Post-war: Protest and Confronta-
tion
Protests against renewal of the US-Japan Secu-
rity Treaty (known as the AMPO tōsō or strug-
gle) starting in 1959, peaked in the summer of 
1960. Following Kishi’s forced approval of the 
treaty in a midnight session of parliament, mil-
lions of Japanese citizens took to the streets for 
months of protest. The numbers were unprece-
dented and have yet to be superseded even to-
day: on June 11th, for example, 235,000 surround-
ed the Diet in Tokyo (Avenell 2010:70). Although 
the protests ultimately accomplished very little 
– apart from the resignation of Kishi – Avenell 
(2010: 63) describes them a “breakthrough for 
civic activism in Japan”, one that gave birth 
to the idea of the citizen or shimin. One group 
commonly seen as the pioneer of civic activism 
in Japan were called Voiceless Voices (Koe Naki 
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Koe no Kai). The name was appropriated from 
a statement by Kishi who argued that the loud 
voices of the protesters (koe aru koe) did not rep-
resent public opinion, the silent majority that he 
called the “voiceless voices” (Avenell 2010: 93). 
This group tried to broaden the demonstrations 
by appealing to ordinary unaffiliated individuals 
in order to break down “the sense of separation 
between political activism and everyday life” 
(Avenell 2010: 93; Sasaki-Uemura 2001: 148).
 In the decades that followed, the AMPO era 
citizens’ movements exerted a major influence on 
the organisation and political philosophies of the 
anti-Vietnam War effort, Narita Airport protests, 
and environmental and consumer movements. 
Citizens were driven to transform Japanese 
society and reshape the body politic through op-
position to Japan’s postwar establishment of pol-
iticians, bureaucrats, and businesspeople. Here, 
Hirata (2002: 15-16) distinguishes shimin undō 
(citizens’ movements) focusing on national issues 
and citizen rights, such as anti-war movements, 
from jumin undō (local resident movements) 
which are less political and more community 
focused. However, Hirata (2002: 17) argues that 
these movements failed to lead to a vibrant civil 
society in Japan in the 1960s and 1970s because 
they were focused on single issues which when 
solved saw the movement disappear.
2.2 1980s: The Rise of NGOs and the 
Mainstreaming of Civic Activism
The preceding section has shown that citi-
zen-based movements – including consumer, 
environmental, and minority social movements 
– have been active in Japan since the 1960s. 
However, it was only with the rise of NGOs in 
the 1980s that Japan’s civil society began to 
mature. Hirata (2002), in a study of the role of 
NGOs in Tokyo’s official development assistance 
(ODA) policy, notes a rapid growth from less 
than a dozen such organisations in the 1960s 
and 1970s to more than a hundred in the late 
1980s to the early 1990s. Indeed, the 1990s saw 
the greatest number of newly established organ-
isations, though numbers began to drop in the 
mid-1990s following the bursting of the bubble 
and the stagnation of membership fees and do-
nations (JANIC 2013). Tsujinaka (2003:91-93), in a 
comparative analysis of a broader range of civic 
organisations in Japan, finds a similar pattern: 
between 1975 and 1991 the total number of such 
organisations almost doubled; on a per-capita 
basis, Japan’s figures were a half of America’s in 
the 1970s before approaching the US figure in 
the late 1980s.
 Two interrelated factors account for this 
growth. The first was Japan’s emergence as an 
economic powerhouse in the 1980s. Growing for-
eign criticism of Japan as an “economic animal” 
and pressure to liberalise its economy saw the 
erosion of the “catch-up” developmental state 
ideology that had focused solely on economic 
growth. “[T]he diminishing capacities of the in-
sulated developmental state”, notes Pekkanen 
(2004: 365), “have opened up new political oppor-
tunities for Japan’s once weak advocacy sector 
to more strongly assert itself in national affairs 
since the 1980s.” Affluence also saw a change in 
values. Mouer and Sugimoto (2003: 219) describe 
a shift in consciousness among the general pop-
ulation away from purely material goals.3
 The second, connected, factor in the NGO 
boom from the 1980s was rapid globalisation. 
This brought an increasing awareness of and 
public interest in the needs of the developing 
world. Hirata (2002: 301-31) identifies the Indo-
chinese refugee crisis of the late 1970s and early 
1980s as a key incident abroad which triggered 
the expansion of NGOs in Japan. Foreign pres-
sure to take on greater leadership and responsi-
bility in the international arena saw a dramatic 
increase in both financial contributions, in the 
form of Overseas Development Aid (ODA)4, and 
physical contributions, such as peace-keeping 
3  See also Hirata on Japan’s authority-challenging 
“post-materialists” (Hirata 2002: 91-95)
4  According to MOFA (2013), Japan was ranked as the 
world’s top ODA provider from 1991 to 2000 on a net 
disbursement basis; from 1985 to 1989, Japan’s contri-
butions more than doubled, seeing it become a major 
donor.
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operations in Cambodia and elsewhere following 
passage of the PKO law in 1992. Awareness of 
global issues heightened through the 1990s. One 
example of such an issue was that of land-mines. 
Public interest in the issue saw Japanese NGOs 
play a key role in pushing the government to 
ratify the international land-mine ban in 1998 
(Hirata 2002: 121), illustrating the increasing 
transnational nature of civil society.
2.3 The Great Hanshin Earthquake: The 
Re-birth of Civil Society
The term shimin shakai (civil society) is still 
not widely used in Japan outside academia; a 
search for the term in the Asahi Shimbun Da-
tabase gives just over a hundred hits each year 
between 1995 and 2001, before falling off. In 
contrast, the terms borantia (volunteer), shimin 
dantai (citizen group), and NGO were fairly 
common even before the 1995 Kobe earthquake, 
though this event saw them become everyday 
terms (Figure 1). Thus, it is important to note 
that interest in citizen participation was increas-
ing even before 1995, encouraged by the end of 
LDP dominance – the so-called 1955 system – in 
1993. In contrast, the word NPO remained very 
much a foreign term in Japan until 1995 when it 
shot to prominence in the build up to the NPO 
law of 1998 (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Number of Articles in the Asahi Shimbun Containing shimin dantai, borantia, NGO, and NPO 
(1984-2012)
Source/Notes: Compiled by the author from the Asahi Shimbun Database (Kikuzō). Articles counted contained the 
terms one or more times in either the heading or body of the article. Figures for NGO and NPO numbers include 
hiʼseifu-soshiki and hiʼeiri-soshiki respectively.
 As Figure 1 shows, the catalyst for “vol-
unteer” and other terms becoming firmly 
established in the Japanese lexicon was the 
Great Hanshin Earthquake which hit Kobe in 
1995. With the government response slow and 
disorganised, some 1.3 million volunteers came 
forward in the weeks following the quake to en-
gage in on-site relief work. Though volunteers 
had appeared in previous disasters, the sheer 
scale of volunteers – many first-timers – saw 
1995 labelled as “the fi rst year of volunteerism 
in Japan.” In other words, 1995 saw volunteering 
– belatedly – gain social legitimacy. The momen-
tum led to the passage of the NPO law (Tokutei 
Hi’eiri Katsudō Sokushin Hō) in 1998, landmark 
legislation which made it easier for existing civil 
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society organisations to apply for legal status 
(Figure 2), though the number of new NGOs 
continued to drop.
Figure 2: Groups Attaining NPO Corporate Sta-
tus under the 1998 NPO Law (1998-2013)
Source: Yomiuri Shimbun (2013b)
As of July 31 2013, 49,929 organisations had ap-
plied for legal status under the NPO law, with 
the vast majority – 47,973 – being approved 
(Cabinet Office 2013b). However, legal status 
does not automatically result in tax exempt sta-
tus. Strict conditions, such as 20% of total reve-
nues being from donations, mean only a handful 
of organisations – only 249 as of April 2012 – 
enjoy tax privileges (Japan Times 2012b). As a 
result, the biggest problem for non-profi t organi-
sations – with or without legal status – has been 
to secure income (Yomiuri Shimbun 2012b). As 
we shall see later, this problem was partially ad-
dressed in a 2012 revision to the NPO law.
 Another feature of the post-Hanshin earth-
quake era was an increase in tax-payer lawsuits 
and freedom of information requests, many of 
which were successful. These increased further 
after Japan’s national information disclosure (jōhō 
kōkai) law took effect in 2001, an achievement 
which owed much to lobbying by the “Citizens 
Movement for an Information Disclosure Law” 
group. Freedominfo.org describes the law as 
“a major milestone in the nation’s development 
as a democratic society.” For many, informa-
tion disclosure is the key to facilitating citizen 
participation in policymaking and increasing 
government accountability to the public (Kings-
ton 2004: chapter 2). Information disclosure is 
closely linked to judicial reform. In 1999, the 
Judicial Reform Council (JRC) was established 
with a remit to consider “a more accessible and 
user-friendly judicial system, public participa-
tion in the judicial system, the redefinition of 
the legal profession and the reinforcement of its 
function” (Cabinet Office 2002). The 2001 JRC 
report led to the biggest postwar reform of the 
judicial system, including establishment of a 
lay-judge system, independent professional law 
schools, and the Japan Legal Support Center 
(Japan Times 2013e). These reforms are said to 
have further strengthened Japan’s civil society.
2.4 The Great East Japan Earthquake: The 
Flowering of Civil Society?
Like the 1995 Kobe earthquake, thousands of 
organisations and over a million volunteers re-
sponded to the 2011 Tohoku quake. Although 
the exact numbers are unclear, according to the 
Japan National Council of Social Welfare (JNCSW 
2013) more than 1.17 million volunteers have 
been active in the affected areas as of March 
2013. In the fi rst four months alone, there were 
almost half-a-million registered volunteers in 
Tohoku (Kingston 2012: 9). In terms of organisa-
tions, some 3,000 have registered with the Cab-
inet Offi  ce for disaster relief; 750 organisations 
were affi  liated with the Japan Civil Network for 
Disaster Relief in the East Japan (JCN) (Yomiuri 
Shimbun 2012a). Although volunteer numbers 
were lower than for Kobe – in part due to the 
more inaccessible nature of the region – the 
government and local infrastructure to facili-
tate volunteering contrasted starkly with Kobe 
where officials often didn’t know what to do 
with the all the off ers of help (Kingston 2012: 9). 
Kingston (Japan Times 2011b) refers to these 
volunteer eff orts as evidence for the “fl owering” 
of civic activism in Japan.
 The large role played by NGOs and NPOs 
in the response to the 2011 earthquake pro-
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moted a further revision to the 1998 NPO law 
which went into force in April 1 2012. The re-
vision made it easier for such organisations to 
secure tax-exempt status. The thinking behind 
the revision was to create incentives for ordi-
nary citizens to make donations, thus improving 
the financial condition of NPOs and enabling 
them to expand their activities in communities 
(Japan Times 2012b). A further change saw local 
governments take over the handling of NPO 
applications, making it easier for NPOs and local 
governments to better cooperate.
 One dramatic development post 3/11 is the 
return5 of citizen voice. Since the mid-1970s, pro-
test movements had declined to be replaced by 
civic movements characterised not by confron-
tation but by “constructive” or “pragmatic” ac-
tivism and cooperation (Avenell 2010: 195). One 
consequence of this shift was that civil society 
groups became unable to function as effective 
checks or monitors – as watchdogs – on state 
action or to influence government policy (Kawa-
to et al. 2012). Kawato et al (2012) point to the 
weak advocacy role of civil society organisations 
– specifically their failure to monitor the nucle-
ar industry – as contributing to the magnitude 
of the nuclear disaster. But after the disaster 
citizens again began to speak out. The turn-out 
of tens of thousands of anti-nuclear protesters 
in Meiji Park in September 2011 harked back 
to the 1960s. By the summer of 2012, more than 
100,000 were gathering at weekly protests in 
front of the Prime Minister’s official residence 
(Kantei mae), the largest demonstrations for 
half a century (Williamson 2012).6 Many writers 
have picked up on the notion of “voice” (koe) in 
describing these protests. Kindstrand (2013) for 
example, focused on the image of one protest-
er’s placard which read kokumin no koe o kike 
5  The is true only of mainland Japan. Protests in 
Okinawa, such as those against government textbook 
changes in September 2007 or Futenma Air Base in 
April 2010, attracted crowds in the tens of thousands 
even before 3/11.
6  At the time of writing these two hour (6-8pm) pro-
tests are still ongoing, although numbers have signifi-
cantly fallen since the June-July 2012 peak. See http://
coalitionagainstnukes.jp/.
(listen to the people’s voices!). Noma (2012: 133), 
in a book sub-titled, The Voice of the Protests 
will Change Politics, describes a wave of indig-
nant voices making visible the will of the people 
(min’i). In sum, the disaster at Fukushima ener-
gised individuals to be more proactive and vocal 
not only about nuclear issues but also about oth-
er issues affecting their lives. This re-discovery 
of voice is especially apparent in the increase in 
the number of local referendums and petitions 
in recent years.
3. Referendums in Japan: Hearing and 
Silencing the Voices
3.1 Referenda in Japan
One problem with the conventional definition of 
civil society is that it focuses on activity that oc-
curs in an organisation, association, or group, the 
so-called “third sector.” For Schwartz (2003: 32) 
and many others, associations are an essential 
part of civil society. This means that individuals 
– the ordinary citizen joining a Voiceless Voices 
march in 1960, the mother attending a Friday 
anti-nuclear protests with her children, the teen 
“liking” a citizen group’s Facebook page, the 
independent volunteer in Tohoku – who are not 
affiliated with any organisation are, by the stan-
dard definition, not part of civil society. Spon-
taneous, informal activities and interpersonal 
practices – whether in groups or not – and “the 
immediate pursuit of self-interest” are similarly 
excluded (Ehrenberg 1999: 235; Pharr 2003: xiv). 
But in many ways these individual acts are the 
most likely to be truly independent of the state:
Those who are urged to transform the 
way they live now take action in their 
own way; some gauge radioactivity 
in communities, some migrate to less 
contaminated places with their children, 
some visit Fukushima to give support to 
its residents, some collect signatures to 
push local legislators to hold a referendum
…and other join demonstrations in the 
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street. It is not difficult to see their 
determination to become independent 
from authority... (Ando 2014: 2)
The ability of the state to appropriate civic or-
ganisations in Japan through registration, paper-
work, funding, regulation, and personnel (staffing 
with ex-bureaucrats) is well documented. “The 
combination of discretionary screening function, 
close supervision of operations, and sanction-
ing power,” writes Pekkanen (2006: 17), “has a 
chilling effect on the vitality of the civil society 
sector.” What Ogawa (2009: 15) refers to as the 
“state-led institutionalization of volunteer-based 
NPOs under the name of civil society” has re-
sulted in a stifling of advocacy roles and impo-
tence in contributing to policy, as illustrated by 
the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Civil society is 
often portrayed as a buffer between state and 
people but, when defined narrowly, it functions 
more like a barrier as organisations soften or 
even silence the voices of ordinary citizens, 
inhibiting rather than facilitating speech, and 
disguising citizen wants and wishes. In this nar-
row definition, civil society fosters only indirect 
democracy since it mediates between citizens 
and state. 
 In contrast, the referendum is often por-
trayed as a direct form of democracy where in-
dividual citizens are given the chance to speak 
directly to and about power. In Japan, there are 
various kinds of referendum (jūmin tōhyō) all of 
them local. National referendums on constitu-
tional issues – like the 1975 UK vote on Europe-
an membership – have not taken place in Japan, 
although any constitutional amendment would 
require ratification by the people in a special 
referendum (Article 96).7 The first type of ref-
erendum are those required by article 95 of the 
constitution when a special law (tokubetsuhō), 
applicable only to one local public entity, is to be 
enacted. These were common in the post-war 
7  A National Referendum Law, passed in 2007 by the 
first Abe cabinet and coming into effect in 2010, clar-
ified the process for revising the Constitution (Japan 
Times 2010)
re-building years, such as the June 1950 Tokyo 
metropolis vote on the special construction law. 
Referendums must also take place when local 
assemblies or offices dissolve usually due to the 
merger of towns and villages. This was partic-
ularly common in first decade of the 2000s in 
the period known as “the great Heisei mergers” 
(heisei no daigappei). Finally, referendums can be 
proposed by citizens or officials under the Local 
Autonomy Law (Chihō jichi hō) which allows for 
the enactment of a local act or ordinance (jōrei). 
This latter type will be the focus here.
 Kobori (2009: 17-18) portrays referendum by 
local ordinance (RLO) as an “incredible success” 
because of their ability to generate extremely 
high turnouts, intense community involvement, 
and lively discussion. He (2009: 18) lists three 
key features of RLOs: first, they are non-bind-
ing; second, they are not limited to local issues; 
and third, only signatures from 2% of the elec-
torate8 are needed to force the local assembly 
to debate holding a referendum. In fact, de-
spite (or perhaps because of) the low signature 
threshold most referendum proposals end up 
being rejected by the local assembly. For exam-
ple, following the nuclear disaster, assemblies 
in Tokyo, Osaka, Shizuoka,9 and Niigata have 
voted down proposals calling for referendums 
on whether to resume operations at – or scrap 
– nuclear power plants, despite more than the 
required number of signatures being collected 
(Japan Times 2013f). Referenda in Japan function 
rather differently to those in other countries, 
acting more like a questionnaire or advisory 
tool: in Japan, the local assembly – not the citi-
zen – has the final say (Numata 2006; Okamoto 
8  In contrast, signatures from one-third of the elector-
ate are needed to instigate a referendum on recalling a 
mayor. 
9  Although the proposal for a referendum in Shizuoka 
was rejected, it has succeeded in raising consciousness 
of the issue. In June 2013, governor Kawakatsu – who 
favours holding a referendum – was easily re-elected in 
an election whose turnout was 49.9%. “Regarding what 
we should do in the end,” remarked Kawakatsu, “we 
should listen to residents in whom sovereignty resides 
[shukensha dearu jūmin ni kiku beki]” (Mainichi Shim-
bun 2013b).
217300_津田塾大学_国際関係学研究.indd   94 2014/03/05   22:14:58
95Japanese Civil Society – Flourishing or Floundering?
2012: 117). Okamoto (2012: 122) calculates that 
only 16% of referendum proposals are actually 
approved though notes that the approval rate is 
much higher for referenda initiated by council-
lors (38%) and mayors (90%). However, in recent 
years a number of municipalities, starting with 
Takahama City in 2000, have passed permanent 
referendum ordinances (jōsetsu-gata jūmin tōhyō 
jōrei) not tied to one single issue (hikobetsu-gata) 
that allow referenda to be held if enough signa-
tures are gathered without the need for local 
assembly or mayoral approval (Okamoto 2012: 
122).
 Although petitions and demands for refer-
enda have been increasing since the late 1970s, 
the RLO held in 1996 in Maki, Niigata over 
the building of a nuclear power plant is widely 
recognised as Japan’s first popular referendum 
(Table 1). Thereafter, over 400 have been held, 
though the vast majority have been related to 
village and town mergers (Okamoto 2012: 115, 
117). Okamoto (2012: 116) argues that the emer-
gence of RLO is a consequence of citizen voices 
and wishes being reflected less and less in the 
decision-making process against the background 
of the Heisei mergers. 
Table 1: Local Referendums by Local Ordinance (Jōrei) in Japan, 1996~2013
Date Place (population) Issue Initiator Turn-out Result
Aug. 1996 Maki, Niigata (30,525) Invite nuclear power plant Councillor 88.29% Rejected
Sep. 1996 Okinawa Prefecture (1.3m) Downsize US base etc Citizens 59.53% Review
Jun. 1997 Mitake, Gifu (20,058) Est. industrial waste plant Citizens 87.51% Rejected
Nov. 1997 Kobayashi, Miya (41,654) Est. industrial waste plant Citizens 75.86% Accepted
Dec. 1997 Nago, Okinawa (52,193) Accept US heliport base Citizens 82.45% Accepted**
Feb. 1998 Yoshinaga, Okayama (5,439) Est. industrial waste plant Citizens 91.65% Rejected
Jun. 1998 Shiraishi, Miyagi (41,505) Est. industrial waste plant Mayor 70.99% Rejected
Jul. 1998 Unakami, Chiba (11.176) Est. industrial waste plant Mayor 87.31% Rejected
Jul. 1998 Kongai, Nagasaki (6,989) Expand quarry Mayor 67.75% Accepted
Jan. 2000 Tokushima City (263,358) Build dam Councillor 54.99% Rejected
May 2001 Kariwa, Niigata (4,761) Introduce nuclear pwr plnt Citizens 88.14% Postponed
Nov. 2001 Miyama, Mie (9,764) Invite nuclear power plant Mayor 88.64% Rejected
Oct. 2003 Hidaka, Kochi (5,940) Est. industrial waste plant Citizens 79.8% Accepted
Oct. 2005 Sodegaura, Chiba (59,549) Develop station Citizens 57.95% Rejected
Mar. 2006 Iwakuni , Ymgch (145,537)* Accept US base Mayor 58.68% Rejected
Dec. 2007 Yotsukaido, Chiba (88,167) Build exchange Center Citizens 47.55% Rejected
Apr. 2008 Izenason, Okinawa (1,523) Build Cattle Ranch Mayor 71.36% Rejected
Nov. 2010 Saku, Nagano (99,961) Build Cultural Centre Mayor 54.87% Rejected
May 2012 Tottori City (194,362) Build new City Office Citizens 50.81% Refurbish
Apr. 2013 Sanyo’onada, Ymg (63,348)* Cut councillor numbers Citizens 45.53% Fail (<50%)
May 2013 Kodaira, Tokyo (180,049) Build road Citizens 35.17% Fail (<50%)
Sources: Kobori (2009: 20); Okamoto (2012: 120); Sankei Shimbun (2013a); Nihon Keizai Shimbun (2012). 
Notes: Referenda on town and village mergers are not included. Permanent Foreign Residents were able to vote in 
2003, 2006, 2008, and April 2013. Highlighted referenda required a turnout of 50% or more to be recognised (except for 
Tokushima, failure to satisfy this condition – seiritsu yōken – meant ballots would not be opened – as happened in the 
Sanyo’onada and Kodaira cases). 
* Denotes “permanent type” (jōsetsu-gata) referenda. This type of referendum usually contains the 50% turnout condi-
tion. All other cases here are single-issue type (kobetsu-gata) referenda. 
**In the December 1997 Nago referendum, voters narrowly rejected the proposal, but the mayor disregarded the result. 
In a later court case, the judge dismissed a suit brought by citizens noting that the result of a referendum is not bind-
ing (Numata 2006: 22).
Table 1 shows how the interest in civil society 
and volunteerism following the Kobe earth-
quake corresponded with a referendum boom in 
the years 1996-1998. Numata (2006: 19) gives two 
reasons for the increase: (1) the perception by 
citizens of referenda as the most useful means 
to express their views and (2) the perception 
by local assemblies of referenda as a useful tool 
for challenging government. Up to 2003 most 
referenda related to the building of industrial 
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waste or nuclear power plants, though recent 
years has seen a diversification of the issues, 
particularly “wasteful” public-works projects. 
Two recent trends can also be seen: a tendency 
to extend the vote to foreign residents and one 
to attach a 50% turnout condition to the vote.
 Although the referenda in Table 1 rep-
resent only the successful few, the heavily 
restricted nature of referenda and their low 
success rate disguises their merits even in cases 
where approval is not given. In the first place, 
simply organising to hold a referendum can 
heighten interest in local and national elections: 
Kobori (2009: 24) notes that referendums in 
Japan have successfully raised voter turnouts. 
Okamoto (2012: 117, 125) identifies three merits: 
(1) expanding participation in and transparency 
of the decision-making process, (2) raising con-
sciousness of the political process, and (3) fos-
tering political literacy. In concrete terms, the 
process of collecting signatures and lobbying the 
local government – characterised by information 
sharing, newspaper articles, meetings, sympo-
siums, study groups, (web) campaigns, and social 
media blitzes – engages citizens in grassroots 
democracy, educates them about the issues, and 
encourages participation of people in local issues 
regardless of ultimate success. This will become 
clearer in the case study of Kodaira below.
3.2  The 2013 Kodaira Referendum
Jennifer Robertson’s (1991) study of Kodaira 
describes the remaking of the town (since 1962 
city) as newcomers flooded in during the 1950s 
and early 1960s and mixed with native citizens. 
Located in Western Tokyo, the population has 
grown by more than 30,000 since Roberston 
wrote and stood at 186,244 as of August 2013 
(http://www.city.kodaira.tokyo.jp/). Unlike cen-
tral Tokyo, Kodaira is full of green spaces and 
fields producing local produce for sale direct to 
citizens. The key feature of Kodaira City is the 
Green Road, a popular 21km tree-lined walking 
path which rings the city and which for 8km 
runs along the historical Tamagawa Aqueduct 
(Tamagawa Jōsui) that since 1654 has carried 
water from the Tama River to the capital 
(http://kodairagreenroad.com/). In his greet-
ing on the city homepage, Mayor Kobayashi 
begins by highlighting the Green Road as the 
key feature of Kodaira, one brought to life by 
Tamagawa Jōsui which has made Kodaira a “rich 
natural environment.” This emphasis on nature 
is also reflected in the citizens’ charter (shimin 
kenshō), the first article of which states, “Let’s 
build a green verdant town to which small birds 
will flock.”
 The story of the Kodaira referendum starts 
some fifty years ago, against the background of 
a booming population and economy. In 1963, the 
Tokyo Metropolitan government put forward a 
plan for a four-lane 1.4km road, part of a 13.6km 
stretch linking Fuchu and Higashimurayama. 
This road was to run through Kodaira Central 
Park dissecting the historical Tamagawa Aque-
duct and the Green Road. Soon after, the plan 
dropped off the political radar but in 1995 it 
was revived. Aside from the economic benefits 
arising from transport improvements, emphasis 
was also put on its role in times of disaster. The 
revived plan was to cost ¥250 billion – most of 
which would be used to compensate the 220 
households who were to be evicted. Almost half 
of 1.3 hectares of woodland was scheduled to be 
cleared and 481 trees chopped down.
 The revival of the old plan triggered con-
cern amongst a number of local groups.　Final-
ly, in October 2012, 13 local citizen groups and 
one NPO10 joined together to form a coalition 
named Kodaira-toshi-keikaku-dōro ni Jūmin no 
Ishi o Han’ei Saseru Kai, literally “Group to Re-
flect the Residents’ Wishes towards the Kodaira 
Metropolitan Road Plan.”11 This is usually short-
ened to “Han’ei Saseru Kai” which I will use 
here on. The rationale for establishing the new 
10  A full list of these groups is available on the group’s 
HP at http://jumintohyo.wordpress.com/.
11  Although there is no official English translation for 
the group, the following was suggested to me: “Citizens 
for Reflecting Peoples’ Opinions on City Road Plans in 
Kodaira.” Here jūmin (resident) is translated as “people” 
and ishi (intention/wish) as opinion.
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group was as follows (my translation):
Many citizens have asked that citizens’ 
wishes regarding this plan be reflected, 
but Kodaira City have said that because 
this is a Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
Public Works Project they are unable to 
comply with our demands. We want to 
tell all citizens about this plan. We want 
citizens’ wishes to be reflected in “town 
building” (machizukuri). This group was 
started in order to implement a referen-
dum to ask whether it was necessary to 
review the plan (http://jumintohyo.word-
press.com/)　
What comes through most strongly here – as 
the group’s name suggests – is frustration that 
local people’s voices had not been adequately 
reflected in the decision-making process to date. 
This is in contrast to Kodaira City who felt that 
enough consultation with locals had been under-
taken (my translation):
In 2006, the Tokyo Metropolitan Govern-
ment and 28 cities and towns drew up 
a (revised) road plan and public opinion 
was broadly canvassed (hiroku iken kōbo). 
Also, recent social changes were taken 
into consideration and the necessity and 
effect of the project were inspected and it 
was decided to go ahead. On top of this, 
some changes were made to the original 
plans for the reason of environmental 
conservation (personal correspondence)
Members of Han’ei Saseru Kai were incredulous 
after seeing this response, and took particular 
umbrage at the claim that public opinion was 
“widely” canvassed. Group spokesperson Ka-
zue Mizuguchi said that most people had no 
idea opinions were being invited and wanted 
to know what opinions had emerged and how 
they had been made use of. She noted that the 
opinions of Kodaira Kankyō no Kai (Environment 
Group), a member of Han’ei Saseru Kai, had not 
been reflected at all in the final plans. What 
comes across here is the large gap in perception 
over what degree of consultation is appropriate 
and whether public opinion needs to be reflect-
ed in a public works project.
 In December 2012, Han’ei Saseru Kai set 
about gathering “signatures” (shomei), knowing 
that if they were able to collect 3,000 – some 2% 
of the voting population – they would be legally 
entitled to ask the local government to hold a 
referendum. For non-Japanese, collecting signa-
tures might seem a simple task, but in Japan 
it is no easy matter. This is because it is not a 
handwritten “signature” that is required at all 
but a personal seal (hanko). The fact that most 
Japanese don’t carry their hanko while out and 
about in town made collecting “signatures” a 
difficult task (although a finger print was also an 
option for those who didn’t mind the ink). If this 
were not enough, signees also had to write their 
date-of-birth, a rather sensitive piece of informa-
tion in an increasingly privacy conscious Japan. 
Finally, Kodaira collectors had to be officially 
approved; non-Japanese residents were not al-
lowed to canvass or sign.
 Despite all the difficulties, by the deadline 
of January 2013 a total of 7,593 signatures had 
been collected, more than twice the required 
amount. The election board ruled 7,183 of these 
to be valid and these were presented to the lo-
cal assembly in February to debate whether a 
referendum should be held or not. This was by 
no means a foregone conclusion; indeed, Mayor 
Masanori Kobayashi made his displeasure clear, 
saying, “it was likely to cause problems for the 
road networking plan of the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government” (Sankei Shimbun 2013b).
 Against this background, the Kodaira As-
sembly’s March decision to allow a referendum 
to go ahead came as a big surprise to many. 
Like the previous ten referendums initiated by 
citizens, it was decided that no conditions (such 
as a minimum turnout) would be attached. The 
fact that citizens were not asking to stop the 
road, just to take another look at the 50-year-
old plan, undoubtedly worked in their favour. 
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Another factor might have been that the group 
had ultimately decided, fearing this might derail 
the whole process, not to ask that Permanent 
Foreign Residents be allowed to vote (opposition 
to foreign participation was reportedly deep 
among many assembly members). Unfortunate-
ly, to Han’ei Saseru Kai’s surprise, it was decid-
ed not to hold the vote in conjunction with the 
upcoming mayoral election, something which 
would have guaranteed a higher turnout.
 Things, however, began to take a turn for 
the worse shortly after Mayor Kobayashi was 
re-elected in April. On April 24th, in a special 
session of the local assembly, a revision (kaiseian) 
was made to the terms of the local referendum: 
in the case of a turnout of less than 50%, bal-
lots would not be opened. Professor Koichiro 
Kokubun, a supporter of the referendum writing 
in the Mainichi Shimbun (2013a) referred to this 
as a “surprise attack” (fuiuchi)12 and denounced 
the attempt by local government to deny citizen 
participation. Certainly, given that the turnout 
in the mayoral election had been around 37%, 
the 50% figure seemed like an impossible hurdle 
– one, moreover, that was not mentioned by Ko-
bayashi in his re-election bid. The revision also 
excluded those having a criminal record from 
the vote, putting them in the same bracket as 
foreign “residents.” 
 Despite the efforts of volunteers to publicise 
the referendum voter turnout on May 26th was 
35.17%, less than the 50% required (http://www.
city.kodaira.tokyo.jp/oshirase/032/032896.html). 
Kobayashi, seemingly questioning the validity of 
his own re-election, declared that such a turnout 
“cannot be said to reflect the collective opinion 
(sōi) of Kodaira citizens” (Tokyo Shimbun 2013). 
On May 28, just two days after the ballot, the 
Tokyo Metropolitan government submitted the 
paperwork for the road plan to the national gov-
ernment for approval.
 Initial reaction to these developments was 
12  It was also commonly referred to as atodashi or 
cheating in rock-paper-scissors by waiting to see your 
opponent’s move first and then playing, illustrating the 
trust that was lost by making such a move.
indignation rather than resignation. For ex-
ample, part 4 of a series of symposiums held 
on June 30th on the theme of decentralisation 
attracted a record turnout and panellists noted 
how Kodaira had become a spark (hakkaten) for 
the broader issues of local democracy that had 
gained attention throughout the country.13 In 
the foyer, T-shirts and badges were on sale con-
taining the name Kodaira with the last “a” elon-
gated signifying “Kodaira-lover”. Media interest 
in the referendum was also intense: on the day 
of the vote over 50 news organisations has gath-
ered outside Kodaira City Hall and many nation-
al newspaper carried editorials and comment 
(Mainichi Shimbun 2013a). 
 A number of moves have been made to get 
the referendum results released and delay con-
struction of the road. On May 27th, Han’ei Saseru 
Kai asked Kodaira City to release the ballots 
and, on June 3rd, representatives visited the To-
kyo Mayor’s Office to request construction be 
stopped until this had happened (Yomiuri Shim-
bun 2013a). Both Kodaira and the Tokyo Met-
ropolitan Government rejected these requests, 
the latter emphasising that completion of the 
trunk road was “essential.” On August 8th, a suit 
was filed in the Tokyo District Court to release 
results, arguing, under the information disclo-
sure law, that non-release was a violation of the 
citizens “right to know” and ultimately unconsti-
tutional (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2013). Against 
these moves, the Ministry of Land, Infrastruc-
ture, Transport, and Tourism officially approved 
construction on August 12th (Asahi Shimbun 
2013a). Despite this setback, on September 10th, 
Han’ei Saseru Kai spokesperson Mizuguchi pre-
sented a petition of 13,390 names to the general 
affairs committee of the local assembly. In the 
meantime, citizens have continued to hold a 
silent (mugen) protest outside city hall every 
Monday.
 The notable thing about the story of To-
kyo’s first local referendum is how the protest 
13  The full video of the symposium is available on You 
Tube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sllUEHI-
ybyE.
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movement morphed from a loose coalition 
questioning the need to destroy a green space 
to build a road based on 50-year-old population 
projections to a broader movement of citizens 
indignant at the indifference and even contempt 
being shown by those in power towards local 
people’s opinions. Despite all the legal obsta-
cles already in place – including the fact that 
even if a referendum is successful it remains 
non-binding – local politicians seemed to be try-
ing their hardest to thwart local activists every 
step of the way. In particular, the way the 50% 
condition (seiritsu yōken) was introduced riled 
many observers. Unfortunately, this condition 
is becoming more common: Okamoto (2012: 124) 
notes that of the 33 municipalities that have set 
conditions, 28 have the 50% condition, a figure 
she argues, citing the German case, needs to 
be seriously reconsidered. In Japan, however, 
the idea that the voice of 50% (or more) of the 
electorate must be respected (sonchō suru) – but 
that less than 50% need not and the ballots dis-
carded – is becoming political “common sense”.14
4. Conclusion: Japan’s Move to the Right 
and the Enemies of Civil Society
Using the Kodaira referendum as a case study, 
this paper has proposed expanding the con-
ventional definition of civil society to include 
all social actors – including individuals – active-
ly participating and interacting in the public 
sphere, both real and virtual. “[T]he way of dis-
cussing civil society in the existing literature is 
a very privileged one”, writes Ogawa (2009: 11), 
“[i]t largely ignores the experience of ordinary 
grassroots people.” Ando (2014: 25) offers a much 
broader definition: “civil society is a place where 
people who are not mandated by states and 
companies but act on their own free will talk, 
make plans, and work together.” This wider 
definition allows a shift in focus from the more 
14  See for example, these words from the mayor of 
Saku City, following the 2010 referendum: “The set con-
dition has been exceeded, so I will respect the result; I 
want to cancel the construction of the cultural centre” 
(Saku City 2010).
abstract national shimin undō (citizen move-
ments) which have tended to be the focus of the 
civil society literature to date to jūmin sanka 
(resident participation): interest in, engagement 
with, and promotion of concrete issues at the 
grassroots level. 
 This change of focus, illustrated by the Ko-
daira case, challenges the common assertion that 
civil society is flourishing in Japan. Kodaira high-
lighted the intransigence of local officials loath 
to listen to individual citizen voices, especially 
in the case of public works which are already 
“decided.” While lip-service is paid to jūmin jichi 
(citizen self-government),15 and citizen partici-
pation – rhetoric which plays well with voters 
– in reality, Kodaira Mayor Kobayashi was un-
able to conceal his view of the referendum as 
a nuisance, harking back to Kishi’s description 
of protesters in 1960 as “distasteful.” The sense 
of powerlessness and exclusion from the deci-
sion-making process generated by the Kodaira 
experience energised some citizens and offered 
a valuable learning experience for many others 
but for the vast – and increasingly silent – ma-
jority it brought home the futility of speaking 
out and a strong sense of resignation often 
voiced as shikata ga nai (it can’t be helped). Such 
developments merely strengthen Japan’s shift 
towards becoming an increasingly muen-shakai: 
a society in which individuals are isolated and 
have weak interpersonal relationships.16
 If a defining feature of civil society is its 
“empowering of individuals to resist” (Schwartz 
2003: 34), then the disempowerment of Japanese 
15  In a flyer distributed to Kodaira households on 
May 30, 2013 announcing the birth of a new municipal 
government, Kobayashi wrote the following: “I think we 
should aim for a society in which people think about 
and solve their problems by themselves, citizen self-gov-
ernment (jūmin jichi) with real responsibility. In order 
to realise that, it is important for citizens as the subject 
of the locality to participate in local government” [my 
translation]. His official greeting on the Kodaira City HP 
(http://www.city.kodaira.tokyo.jp/kurashi/001/001841.
html) also talks of building a “partnership” between citi-
zens and government.
16  In contrast to Americans who are increasingly 
Bowling Alone (Putnam 1995), there are more and more 
cases of Japanese dying alone, a phenomenon known as 
kodokushi.
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citizens by obstructing their ability to engage in 
direct democracy would suggest that Japanese 
civil society is far from blooming. A concrete ex-
ample of such obstruction is the “50% condition”, 
a stipulation which is becoming increasingly 
common and renders referenda invalid (and bal-
lots unopened) unless 50% or more of the elec-
torate vote. If civil society connotes a society 
committed to making “meaningful participation 
possible” (Mouer and Sugimoto 2003: 209, 215) 
– a definition that includes a sense of responsi-
bility for the outcomes representatives achieve 
– the evidence presented here suggests it is 
not flourishing but floundering. In a June 2013 
poll, 60% said they didn’t think political protests 
have any effect to move the government (Asahi 
Shimbun 2013b). Disillusionment with politicians 
has seen a growing apathy towards participat-
ing in politics in recent years, as evidenced by 
falling turnout rates in elections. For example, 
the LDP landslides of Dec 2012 (lower house) 
and July 2013 (upper house) hid very low turn-
out rates. The former posted a postwar record 
low turnout of 59.32% for single-seat constitu-
encies ( Japan News 2013) while the turnout for 
the latter, despite internet election campaigning 
being allowed for the first time, was 52.61%, the 
third lowest in the postwar years (Japan Times 
2013d). In between, the June 2013 Tokyo Metro-
politan Assembly Election garnered a turnout of 
43.5%, the second-lowest figure recorded ( Japan 
News 2013). Turnout for young people in partic-
ular tends to be around 20% percentage points 
less than the total turnout (Yomiuri Shimbun 
2013c).
 The reasons behind voter apathy were 
widely discussed and debated in the media, such 
as the following Japan Times article written on 
the eve of the July poll:
What’s most noticeable…is the silence 
of the citizenry. Try finding the slight-
est hint that voters are fired up…Per-
haps voters sense that the outcome is a 
fait accompli (Japan Times 2013c)
Echoing the theme of voter apathy, the Japan 
News (2013) ran an article titled “Many Can-
didates Baffled by Voters’ Inactive Response.” 
One reason for the general puzzlement was the 
fact that on one of the hot issues of the time – 
whether to re-start nuclear power plants in the 
short-term and continue with nuclear energy in 
the long-term – the LDP was directly at odds 
with public opinion (Asahi Shimbun 2013b). 
Moreover, it was not only public opinion that the 
LDP was against: local governments throughout 
Japan are increasingly promoting the goal of a 
nuclear-free society (Asahi Shimbun 2013c), cre-
ating a widening gap – a disconnect – between 
what localities want to do and what the nation 
actually is doing. This disconnect is reflected in 
a growing dissatisfaction among voters with the 
lack of representation of their voices and values 
in the Diet (Ando 2014: 23). The landslides of 
2012 and 2013 were less to do with the popular-
ity of the LDP and more to do with disenchant-
ment at the performance of the DPJ.
 In an attempt to define the concept, Hall 
(1995: 7-15) identifies five enemies of civil society. 
The first of these is despotism, which describes 
the concentration of power and authority includ-
ing the “tyranny of the majority.” The recent 
LDP landslides in both houses together with 
the spread of the “50% condition” suggest this 
may apply to Japan. The second “enemy” of civil 
society is the imposition of “civic virtues” often 
implemented through moral education. In Japan, 
moral education has taken on increasing impor-
tance in recent years starting with the Kokoro 
no Nōto (Notebook of the Heart) readers in 2002, 
through the revised Fundamental Law of Ed-
ucation (2006) and 2008 Course of Study (shidō 
yōryō), and culminating in the proposal to make 
morals a regular subject in schools by 2018 (Japan 
Times 2013b; Maruyama 2013; MEXT 2013). The 
third enemy is nationalism, specifically those 
types of nationalism that emphasise social homo-
geneity. There have been many signs of a shift 
to the right (ukeika) in Japan recent years, such 
as the very visible emergence of extremist an-
ti-foreigner groups like Zaitokukai (MacKinnon 
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2010); the new conservative LDP administration 
has merely heightened such fears. This ties in 
with a fourth enemy, cultural essentialism. Sec-
tion 2 touched on Nihonjinron, a popular genre 
of writing that emphasises Japan’s cultural 
uniqueness. A central premise of Nihonjinron 
is that the Japanese are a homogeneous people 
(tan’itsu minzoku) which constitute a racially 
unified nation (tan’itsu minzoku kokka). The final 
enemy of civil society are totalising ideologies 
especially in late development countries where 
power is concentrated in a centralised state. Al-
though the days of the Japanese developmental 
state are over, there are signs of more totalitari-
anism. For example, the 2013 secrets protection 
law that stiffens penalties against civil servants 
who leak classified information was opposed by 
the Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors As-
sociation as a violation of the right to freedom of 
speech that will undermine Japan’s democracy 
(Japan Times 2013a).
 In his The Failure of Civil Society? Ogawa 
(2009: 182) describes a growing realisation during 
his fieldwork that the huge upsurge in NPO 
incorporation in Japan occurred simultaneously 
with nationalistic policy moves. These moves in-
cluded the flag/anthem law of 1999 and the re-
vision to the Fundamental Law of Education in 
2006. Today, discussions centre on constitutional 
revision. As seen earlier (footnote 7), the first 
Abe cabinet clarified the process for revising 
the Constitution in the form of the National Ref-
erendum Law. The new Abe cabinet – armed 
with large majorities17 – is moving cautiously 
but there is little doubt revision remains one of 
Abe’s major long-term policy goals (Japan Times 
2013g). Morris-Suzuki (2013) describes the LDP’s 
proposal to rewrite the postwar Japanese con-
stitution18 as so “far-reaching” as to effectively 
17  Abe aims to reduce the majority needed for consti-
tutional revision stipulated in Article 96 from two-thirds 
to half, a move which contrasts with increasingly strict 
rules on minimum turnout for local referendums .
18  The full text of the Liberal Democratic Party’s 
2012 proposal for constitutional reform is available (in 
Japanese) on the Party’s website at http://www.jimin.
jp/policy/policy_topics/pdf/seisaku-109.pdf.
comprise a new constitution. In particular, she 
notes the rolling back of individual rights and 
the key principle that sovereignty lies with the 
people:
The proposed changes include removing 
the re ference to  “respect  for  the 
individual” and making it constitutionally 
imposs ib le  for  fore ign permanent 
residents to be given national or local 
voting rights. Freedom of expression 
and freedom of association would not be 
protected where these “have the purpose 
of harming the public interest or public 
order”. The same formula would be 
used to limit the right of citizens to “life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” 
The revised constitution prepared by 
the Liberal Democratic Party contains 
no guidelines as to how, and by whom, 
“public interest” and “public order” 
would be defined, leaving an alarmingly 
large loophole for the repression of civic 
freedoms by the state. A new article 
would also be added to the constitution 
to give the state sweeping powers to 
declare prolonged states of emergency, 
during which constitutional rights could 
be suspended. (Morris-Suzuki 2013)
In conclusion, the power of the state at both the 
local and national level seems to be growing, 
throwing doubt on claims that Japanese civil so-
ciety is flourishing. Amid an environment where 
citizens are increasingly deprived of the oxygen 
needed to speak out and question authority, the 
fear is that we are witnessing a return of the 
“voiceless voices” which characterised pre-war 
and early post-war Japan.
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